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ABSTRACT
Utilizing mine-level data collected from coal mine operators by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration from 1972 combined with inspection and citation data collected by the same
Administration since 1983, a detailed analysis of the effects of regulatory enforcement on coal mine
productivity was performed. Inspections in and of themselves were found to have no effect on
productivity, though a strong correlation exists between mines receiving high numbers of citations for
dangerous conditions and low labor productivity. The size of an operation, measured by output, was
found to have an effect on average levels and growth rates of labor productivity.
Several analytical issues are raised by this research. Of fundamental importance is separating out the
effects of inspections from the underlying reasons for the inspection. The number of inspections is largely
determined by mine size, conditions such as presence of methane, and past safety history. Additionally, a
citation, which indicates non-compliance, arises from an inspection, which does not indicate, a priori,
such a violation. The mechanism through which labor productivity and regulatory enforcement are
related is not identified ihi this analysis, though further analytical techniques and sources of data which
may shed light on the issue are introduced.
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Title: Senior lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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1 Introduction
Coal mining in this country is part of a much larger set of issues and interactions regarding resource
depletion, energy use, environmental concerns and economics. The mining practices vary considerably,
as does the geological nature of the deposits being mined. Transportation of the coal is a serious concern,
at time accounting for over half of the delivered price. To understand the changing nature of coal markets
and mining, one needs to examine the mining industry not only at the point of extraction, but where the
demand is located and where investment in new supply is taking place.
Central to the success of a coal mine and, indeed, to a coal-mining region is the cost at which it can
deliver the coal to its customers. This is highly influenced by the cost of extraction and, even more
important, whether this cost is rising or falling. Conventional resource economics identifies two key
determinants to the cost of extraction: depletion and technological progress. The former will lead to
rising marginal cost of supply, since the coal extracted early will be that which is easiest to mine. As
mining continues, the working face will be ever farther from the mine mouth, entailing longer and more
complicated structures to move workers, equipment and coal. Technological progress, on the other hand,
is expected to counteract these scarcity concerns. By employing better equipment, more coal can be mined
more cheaply, goes the argument. Even if existing mines cannot take advantage of new technology,
improved information and equipment will make possible the prospect of starting a new mine with
considerably lower supply costs, thus inviting investment.
Things are clearly changing, whatever the reason. Mines today are producing more coal with lower
amounts of labor, capital or material usage: output which has come "for free" due to better or more
efficient mining methods. This has been seen at the national and regional levels. Not all regions have
improved at the same rate, however, and there are still very large disparities in supply costs across
regions. More specifically, the growth in total factor productivity has not been uniform across the
different mining sectors. Total factor productivity is the change in output after accounting for changes in
the various inputs. For example, if an operator increases usage of all inputs by 20% and output rises by
30%, there is said to be a 10% growth in total factor productivity. It is the growth achieved at no cost.
Productivity has clear implications for the cost of supply for mines and the mining industry. Where
productivity can be expected to increase, investment is attracted, as the more productive, lower cost
supplier will be able to enjoy higher profit margins. If the new entrants are very large, as in the case of
some western surface mines, they can capture market share away from other suppliers. Indeed, work done
at the national level has shown productivity growth to be a principal determinant of the price of coal. The
big question, then, is what determines productivity growth?
In the arguments about technological change, the passage of time is credited with providing for improved
equipment, better information, and more efficient practices. In most industries, including coal mining,
the process gets more efficient over time. How much of these improvements can actually be manifest into
the industry depends on several factors. First is whether the state of the technological art is fixed once a
mine is in place - if the technology is embodied. This is akin to the automobile engine: no matter how
good today's engines may be, the performance of any one engine is fixed at the time it is cast.
Alternatively, one may be inclined to believe that existing mines can benefit from improving technology
and information. Certainly one would expect learning by doing improvements to be realized, especially in
the initial quarters of production. The way in which existing mines can utilize technological
improvements will greatly affect the rate at which improvements diffuse into the industry. If technology is
truly embodied, then improvements will only come about through the replacement of mines with new
mines, or through large-scale retrofitting of existing operations such as in longwall mines.
Seeking new ways to extract coal at lower cost is not the only focus of a mine operator's energies,
however. In 1969, Congress passed the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act following a large and
devastating mine collapse in Farmington, West Virginia, which resulted in large loss of life. The main
focus of the Act was reducing the incidence and death associated with mine accidents, as well as
improving the working conditions for miners, primarily by reducing the amount of dust and particulates
which can be present in the working environment. Additionally, several states were enacting legislation
to mitigate aesthetic and environmental deterioration associated with surface mining. These state
programs lead to federal regulation in the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
The 1970's were a period of widespread productivity decline for the industry. The coal industry was not
alone; economic activity in the nation as a whole grew at a rate far below that for the previous decades.
While several ideas were put forward, government regulation was attacked by some as being a major
reason for the decline in productivity.
The research in this thesis focuses on enforcement of the CMHSAct by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration from 1983-1994. Beyond looking simply at enforcement effort, we will examine the
impact on the productivity of mines in several different coal producing areas in the United States. The
importance of this period is that it is an eleven year period of unambiguous growth in productivity, albeit
at different rates for different regions. Secondly, it is far enough since the enactment of the regulations to
make reasonable the assumption that expectations of operators and investors have come to fully
incorporate the new regulatory structures. This allows us to look less at the initial-year impact on the
industry, which would mostly have fallen on requiring existing mines to change their practices, and more
on the running impacts of the regulation.
Organization of Thesis
The thesis is organized into five chapters and an appendix. Chapter 2 gives a more thorough background
to mining in the United States, identifying production and labor trends for the various regions since 1972.
It also delves deeper into understanding the structural as opposed to mine-level technological changes
which affect productivity. Insight is given regarding the dynamics of the industry, looking especially at
the differences across age or vintages of mines even within a particular region. Chapter 3 is a detailed
discussion of the data upon which the later analysis rests. After describing the source and arrangement of
the data, and explaining certain assumptions embodied in the manipulation of the data, a comparison is
made with similar data available from other sources. Furthermore, it offers a justification for using labor
productivity data to examine total factory productivity trends.
Chapter 4 is the principal analysis chapter. This chapter brings together information on inspections and
citations under the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act and data on the operating performance of the mines.
After a regional analysis of productivity and enforcement is found to be promising but inconclusive, a
mine-level analysis is developed. Once the intuitive background for such an analysis is explained, a more
formal econometric model is proposed, and results are briefly discussed. This issue of determining
causation, and the inherent difficulties in doing so, is explored, as are additional methods and data which
may help advance the research.
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the main findings. Additionally, it places the current research in the context
of a fuller analysis of regulatory effects. Areas for further research are also summarized.
An appendix contains the output logs from the various regression models, as well as additional data to
support the analysis.
Summary of Findings
The principal findings of this thesis is that mines which continue to employ unsafe mining practices, as
evidenced by the most severe type of citation, are unambiguously at a productivity disadvantage. Even
stronger is the relationship in the other direction: the high-productivity mines always have low numbers of
severe citations. This is particularly true for underground mines, which we expect since the Act's primary
focus was underground rather than surface operations.
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The burden imposed on mines due to the intrusive nature of inspections was not found to have a
significant negative effect on labor productivity. This is in contrast to some industry claims that
inspections and recordkeeping divert sufficient resources away from the actual mining operation to
depress productivity. While this claim may have had some validity in the initial years of the Act, there is
every indication that mine operators have become quite efficient at working within the administrative
requirements of the Act.
As a result of having to control for scale effects within the various regions, some insight was gained into
the benefits to making mines of a particular size - is larger better? In the case of surface mines, the
answer seems to be a strong "yes". In both Appalachia and the Interior, larger mines had higher levels of
productivity. In the Powder River Basin and Lignite regions, the trend was less clear, but there was also
more uniformity in the level of productivity. Western surface mines, a group plagued by falling
productivity since the 1970's, seem equally dismal regardless of size, with the exception of the very
largest mines, which appear to buoy the entire region with their high productivity levels. Growth rates
display less clear scale effects.
The scale effects for underground mines are not as obvious as for the surface mines. In the Interior and
Western regions, scale seems to play an important role in determining the level of labor productivity,
though the Interior shows signs that, at the extreme sizes, this effect is somewhat negated. Appalachia
shows little dependence on scale at all.
2 The Importance of Productivity in U.S. Coal
This chapter provides an overview of the coal industry in the United States: where is it mined, how is it
mined, and the changing shares of national output. Additionally, labor productivity trends are presented
for different coal-producing regions and methods.
The second aim of this chapter is to provide a background to the various factors which affect labor
productivity. This includes a discussion of what affects aggregate (for a region or state) labor productivity
as well as differences in productivity across different regions, methods, and vintages. This leads to a
better understanding of the dynamic process through which mine-level improvements in labor productivity
are realized for the region and, eventually, for the industry.
Overview of U. S. Coal
Coal is mined in the U.S. in three broadly defined areas, by either of two possible methods. The
geographic areas are Appalachia, the Interior, and the West, as shown in the map, below. The West is not
a well-defined region, but rather refers to all regions outside of the readily-identifiable coal-bearing areas
of the Interior and Appalachia. Consequently, two sub-regions within the West are identified: Lignite and
the Powder River Basin. These areas are either geologically uniform and tightly defined (PRB) or refer to
a different type of coal (Lignite).
Mines can be either underground or surface mines. Underground mines involve drilling a network of
shafts and adits (horizontal tunnels), complete with supporting transport within them for both workers
and coal. The size can range from small, labor intensive operations to much more mechanized mines
where the geology is more favorable. Longwall mining, a new underground mining method, is a further
extension of mechanized sub-surface mining. Surface mines are employed where the coal lies in fairly
uniform, thick seams near the surface of the ground. Very large machines are used to remove the non-
coal earth, exposing the coalbeds. These can then be readily scraped down by earth-moving vehicles, the
coal being shuttled to the processing plant by a continuous convoy of trucks.
Generally speaking, surface mining is dominant in the Western states, accounts for two-thirds of output in
the Interior, and one-third in Appalachia, where underground mining is still dominant.
Figure 2-1 shows several interesting statistics which give a good picture of the mining industry in the
United States. Appalachian and Western mines both produce about the same amount of coal, yet the
Western region is home to far fewer mines. Beyond indicating that Western mines must obviously be
several orders larger in ouput than their Appalachian counterparts, this difference indicates also where
most of the labor force will be concentrated: in Appalachia, where most of the activity is in more labor-
intensive sub-surface operations rather than large surface mines.
U.S. Coal Output by Region, 1993 U.S. Coal Mines by Region, 1993
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Of course, coal is not traded in a homogeneous world or even national market. The delivered price of coal
is, in large part, transportation costs. Second, coal is sold by various grades -BTU content, sulfur content,
moisture, and others. Since the grade is often determined by physical location, not all grades compete for
the same markets. One example is coal for electric utilities - the largest single consumer of U.S. coal.
Utilities, under orders to reduce their sulfur emissions, have been buying more western-mined, low-sulfur
coal. This has been possible, at least in part, due to the fall of railroad transportation prices following
deregulation of that industry. The demand for coal is not homogeneous: distance from the source as well
as individual grade requirements prevent it from being such. Nevertheless, some large and dramatic shifts
do occur in the industry if a lower-cost region becomes a major producer, and the particular type of coal
found there finds new appeal. Such was the case with the Powder River Basin.
The Powder River Basin
The Powder River Basin is an area in the northeast counties of Wyoming, extending into a few southern
Montana counties. It is the site of the most intensive, large-scale surface mining operations in the
country. In the twenty years between 1972 and 1992 the Powder River Basin went from negligible
production to accounting for roughly 25% of the nation's output.
Figure 2-2
The Powder River Basin, with only a few dozen mines, has surpassed the entire Interior region with its
many thousand mines. Why was this possible? The trivial answer is that vast amounts of coal from the
region could be brought to market at a cost below the going price. This does not answer the real question,
which gets at the underlying difference between Basin coal and coal from the other mining regions of the
nation.
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One great difference is geology. Massive strata of coal lie at shallow depth in the Powder River Basin
area. This is in stark contrast to the intricate mine seams of the Appalachian states. The tremendous
regularity of the geology makes it amenable to a highly mechanized method of extraction. Namely, strip
mining, where the non-coal overburden is taken off, and large machines remove the coal. A third step,
the replacement of the overburden, is performed for aesthetic and environmental reasons, though this was
not always the case.
The difference between the two is the reliance on human labor. In the Basin, a mammoth machine is
perfectly suited to deal with highly regular, large volume extraction of coal. Not so where the geology is
more complex. This reliance on labor is measured in studies of productivity, the topic of discussion for
the next section.
Labor Productivity
Simply defined, labor productivity is the number of tons of coal produced for each miner-hour of work.
Figure 2-3 shows the relative labor productivities for the Appalachian and Interior states, as well as for the
Powder River Basin.
Regional Labor Productivity Levels
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Figure 2-3
There is no obvious reason why labor productivity levels alone should be particularly important. After all,
one can probably substitute capital or energy for labor if the price of labor becomes too high. In a sense,
this single-input measure of productivity is a reflection of the prices and productivities of all inputs. If, for
example, energy prices rise to the point that manual labor is cheaper, more workers will be hired to make
up for the lower usage of machines. If output is kept roughly constant, then the increase in labor
t
requirement is bound to be reflected as lower labor productivity. One cannot say whether this is a "good"
or "bad" thing; it is simply a reflection of the shifting value of the different inputs.
A better measure is total- or multi-factor productivity. A given amount of output can be produced from a
nearly infinite number of different combination of four basic inputs: labor, capital, energy and materials.
Different combinations may be more "efficient" than others: a long miner with a pick and shovel could
almost certainly stand to gain from some small expenditure on power-tools, say. The crux of the matter is
identifying shifts in input combinations which result in more efficient production from shifts which do
not. The determination of single and multifactor productivity is futher addressed in Chapter 2. For now,
the simple intuitive definition is enough to make our argument.
The Importance of Productivity
A large part of the motivation for this research comes, not surprisingly, from previous research. Recent
studies on factors influencing the price of coal [Ellerman 1995] show the remarkable importance of total
factor productivity. Whereas capacity utilization and output were not convincing explanations, the match
between price and productivity were surprisingly good. Since TFP is a measure of how much extra output
we get "for free", its relationship to total supply cost is not difficult to imagine. Higher TFP levels
essentially shift the supply curve to the right: more firms become lower-cost producers than before. Figure
1-XX shows the relationship between the unit input, or the inverse of productivity, and the price of coal.
The resounding lesson here is that, to understand the price fluctuations of the industry, knowledge of
productivity trends is the single most important piece of information one should gather.
Getting Below the Aggregates
Until recently, productivity figures were only examined at the national aggregate level. While this is
clearly an important metric, reflecting how efficiently the nation's coal industry delivers its product, it
hides a much more compelling story. As explained previously, the markets for coal, both end-users and
suppliers, are far from homogeneous. These regional variations are totally masked when aggregated to
the national level. That is hardly the end of the story, however. Even within regions, the grouping
together of underground and surface mines hides shifts in productivity specific to a particular mining
practice. This is most notable in the Appalachian states, where underground mining productivity has
surged, whereas surface mining productivity only recently regained its 1972 levels, as shown in Figure 2-
4, below.
Appalachia Labor Productivity
Figure 2-4
This raises some very interesting questions. For example, why has surface mining lagged behind
underground mining in recovering from a fall in labor productivity during the 1970's? How did
underground mining increase its labor productivity by 96% in the same time that surface mines managed
only a 13% rise? Another feature from Figure 1-XX is the importance of share of output. There is
clearly something quite different occuring in Appalachia's surface mining industry which is simply not
captured in the regional trend. Needless, to say, this would be completely obscured in any national
statistic. The face that surface mining accounts for only one-third of regional output and labor explains
why its effect on the regional figures is small.
Do we see the loss of such trends in other areas? Yes, and the case of the Western states is even more
revealing. While the mines of the Powder River Basin have been surging forcefully ahead, both in terms
of productivity and in terms of share of national output, other Western mines have fared less well. Figure
2-5 shows productivity of surface mines in the Powder River Basin compared to Western mines outside of
the Basin.
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The Basin mines are simply overwhelming the non-Basin mines, which are clearly in dire straits
regarding labor productivity. The Basin mines, however, have surged from being less than 25% of
Western output to comprising nearly 80%. This has the effect of making the regional statistic resemble
the Basin figure more each year. Notice that the prolonged decline and then stagnation of surface mining
labor productivity in non-Basin mines has had almost no impact on the regional statistic.
It should come as no surprise, then, that national figures hide yet another vital aspect of the mining
industry; that of dynamic entry and exit of mines. The Mine Safety and Health Administration has issued
identification numbers for over 33,000 mines. Currently, there are about 3,000 active mines. Clearly
there must be an underlying dynamic of old mines ceasing production and new mines entering the
industry. Again, the national and regional aggregates hide this aspect of the industry.
Consider Figure 2-6, which shows the composition of mines in the Interior states. The mines are divided
into three broad groups: the continuing mines, the exiting mines, and the vintages. The continuing mines
are those that existed at the beginning of our period, 1972, and continued to produce through to the end of
our records, in 1992. The exiting mines are those which existed in 1972, but ceased production before
1992. Finally, the vintage mines are grouped according to the year they entered production. For example,
the 86 vintage shown in the figure are all mines in the Interior region which entered production in 1986.
They have not been subdivided into mines from each vintage which continue producing through until
1992 and those that ceased: that can be inferred from the relative "fattening" or "thinning" of each
vintage's output.
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Figure 2-6
If one merely saw the total regional output figures, one would be led to believe that this was a relatively
steady time for Interior mines: some increase in production, with only one real drop in output in 1978. A
closer look at the mine composition reveals that, of all the 1972 production, over one half came from
mines which would not survive another twenty years. Those mines that did survive the two decades
managed to somewhat increase their output. Still, in 1992 only one-third of total output came from mines
which existed in 1972. Far from the image of modest growth one would get from the aggregate picture,
this was a period where many mines closed, and most of the growth of output came as old mines were
replaced by new mines.
Similar figures can be produced for the Appalachian and Western states, though the compositional shifts
are less dramatic. The West, in particular, has seen really no loss of mines at all: the fantastic growth of
the Powder River Basin has allowed most mines which entered or were pre-existing to continue
production.
The underlying dynamic of shifting importance of regions, mining methods, and vintage effects of mines
lead us to go beyond the national or even regional figures. The question that immediately arises is
whether labor productivity plays as important a role in compositional shifts and entry and exit as it does in
prices. For this, a comparison of productivity between the various vintages, exiting, and continuing mines
is illuminating.
Figure 2-7 shows labor productivity trends for the mines in the Appalachian states. The new mines are
shown with a circle at the productivity level of their first year of production. In almost every year, the new
mines outperform the old continuing mines. Not surprisingly, the low productivity levels of exiting mines
were the very reason for their demise.
Figure 2-7
Environmental Health and Safety Regulation
There are two broad classes of environmental regulation which affect coal mining. The aim of this
chapter is to introduce these regulations and provide an overview of how they may influence mine
productivity. Furthermore, data is put forth which can be used to test more specifically how these
regulations affect both the level and growth of labor productivity in coal mines.
The environmental laws most relevant to coal mining deal either with workplace safety concerns for the
miners or with mitigating aesthetic and environmental detriment to the area surrounding the mining
operations. The regulation primarily responsible for workplace safety is the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act (MSHA). The regulation focusing on environmental remediation is the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA).
Appalachian Underground Mines
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Regulatory Impact on Surface Mines
While MSHA does apply to surface mines, the nature of the work is so different from underground mining
that the brunt of the regulations affected the subsurface mines. Surface mines still were required to file
with MSHA quarterly reports on output, labor and injury, however. The majority of regulation affecting
surface mines stems less from a need to protect workers than from a need to lessen environmental damage
to the area being mined. The source of these regulations is SMCRA.
SMCRA is quite different from MSHA in its history, as well. Whereas underground mining has always
been recognized as a dangerous business, the pressure leading to passage of SMCRA arose mostly out of
public dissatisfaction with the effects of strip mining. This lead to surface mining laws at the state level:
initially in eastern states, later in western states as increasingly heavy mining moved there. SMCRA was
enacted in 1977 as a federal effort to standardize and coordinate the various laws existing in 23 different
mining states.
Small differences aside, surface mining laws generally require a certain level of "restoration" after mining
is complete. Since strip mining involves the removal of non-coal surface material followed by the
scraping of the coal, massive amounts of earth were displaced. The laws general call for replacing the
overburden, as well as standards for how terrain is to be re-contoured.
The general impact on the mining operation is an increase in workforce and machinery to comply with the
clean-up of the site after mining is complete. This involves not only additional earthmoving equipment,
but equipment to grade and sort soil, as well as more administrative personnel to document compliance.
Regulatory Impact on Underground Mines
Underground mines are the main focus of the MSHA regulations. Enacted in 1969, partly in response to
the 1968 Farmington, West Virginia mine explosion which killed 78 miners, MSHA seeks to minimize
the occurrence of catastrophes as well as to reduce the fatality of these incidents. MSHA specifies with
great detail requirements for ventilation, tunnel supports, coal dust suppression, and maintenance of
mining machinery. Furthermore, MSHA required a greater level of detailed reporting by mines of output
at various mining subunits, as well as worker-hours not just at the mine face but in processing plants,
stock yards, shops and administrative offices. Worker injury data is also required, including non-fatal
injuries, regardless of whether they lead to a loss of worker hours. Finally, MSHA requires inspections of
each mine, and allows additional inspections for a variety of reasons.
The coal industry has long argued that the regulations imposed a large burden on the mines, leading to the
loss of productivity seen in the years following the enactment of the regulation. Exactly how the law
would affect productivity, and whether or not these would be permanent effects, merits some
consideration.
MSHA can affect mine productivity in two general ways. First, the actual requirements of the law can
impose conditions which.draw resources away from direct production activity. Second, the incidence of
inspections itself leads to lowered productivity while the inspection is underway.
MSHA provisions which may hinder productivity by altering the way in which underground mining is
carried out include roofbolting requirements, ventilation and dust suppression, and structural layout
requirements. MSHA forbids miners working under unsupported roofs, thus limiting the advance of
continuous mining machines to their length: about twenty feet. Prior to MSHA's enactment, many
operators would advance nearly 100 feet prior to providing for support. The constant need to stop mining
operation to put roofbolts in place would clearly hinder traditional mining operations. Ventilation and
dust suppression requirement pose similar conditions. Operators routinely complain about having to
maintain and replace nozzles which clog easily, being unable to advance the mine face without further
extending the ventilation systems, and so on. Finally, the plans for mining layout and measures to be
taken to provide appropriate support and ventilation must be revised with MSHA inspectors twice a year,
usually. These measures are presumably the ones most necessary for the prevention of large mine
catastrophes. If this disregard for safety resulted in higher levels of labor productivity - in itself a
contentious point - it is not hard to see how restrictions on these practices would cut into productivity.
From a procedural standpoint, MSHA's many reporting, sampling, and inspection provisions diverted
labor from the actual mining-of coal to the process of complying with regulations. Quarterly reporting of
output, labor and injuries meant an increase in administrative personnel. Requirements for constant
monitoring of gasses and dust levels, quite apart from suppression and control requirements, also called
for the hiring of people to carry out the various tests. Finally, the inspection of the mine by MSHA
officials itself entails a reduction in productivity, as it will probably entail some disruption of work.
Measuring Impact of Environmental Regulations on Productivity
There are several possible ways in which we may look at available data to establish a relationship between
MSHA and SMCRA and changes in labor productivity. First, and most simplistically, would be to look
for any dramatic changes in labor productivity series around the time of enactment of these regulations.
Second, one can try and discern a correlation between enforcement level and labor productivity. Third,
the amount of labor going strictly to administrative work can be scrutinized for indication of the
administrative burden of the acts. A brief discussion of the feasibility, value and limitations of each
approach is merited.
To search for a discernible "kink" in a labor productivity time series is fraught with difficulties. The
primary difficulty is the time scope of our data: no pre-1972 figures are available at the mine level.
MSHA was enacted in 1969, and became fully implemented in the early 1970's. The formation of this
dataset was one of their very obligations. In a sense, using an MSHA-derived dataset precludes, by
definition, any data prior to the regulation. A second issues is that there is no such thing as a smoothly-
evolving time series for labor productivity; certainly not at the mine-level. This frustrates efforts to
identify any abnormal changes in labor productivity, as the backdrop of yearly changes is already quite
large in most cases. In other words, the opportunity to find a change in productivity which is so
pronounced and so close to the enactment date of either regulation as to rule out the possibility that it
could be attributed to anything but the regulation simply does not exist.
The issues with SMCRA are different. We have data prior to 1977, the enactment date of SMCRA.
However, most mine-producing states had their own surface mining laws prior to that. The extent of the
state regulations, as well as their respective enactment dates and the dates of any amendments or
reauthorizations vary considerably, complicating efforts. For a few large states, however, it would be
worthwhile to explore this type of before-and-after analysis.
The second type of analysis, that of relating enforcement level to changes in productivity, is more
promising. It primarily seeks to establish the productivity effect of actual enforcement and inspection, as
opposed to compliance. One may tend to believe, then, that any productivity change resulting from the
need to comply remains untested, since compliance usually entail longer-term changes than simply fixing
up the mine on the eve of an inspection. One important piece of information on whether productivity is
most affected by compliance or by inspections would be changes in fatal injuries. If it can be shown that
these injuries - which are the focus of MSHA regulation - has unambiguously fallen, then it would
strengthen the argument that it is actual inspections which are affecting productivity, compliance having
already occurred as demonstrated by the improved safety data.
A slightly different approach to interpreting enforcement data comes from panel comparisons of mines.
For a given year, mining method and region, we can compare the changes in labor productivity over the
previous year for mines experiencing very little enforcement and those subjected the the heaviest
enforcement. Since enforcement can reasonably be expected to be more extensive for big mines, as more
people are affected, we would hope to compare mines of similar output but with different productivity
levels. One limitation will be if enforcement is indicative of a totally different characteristic. If, say,
enforcement is very heavy on mines operated by traditionally unsafe operators, then the comparison is
really between safe and unsafe mines of similar size, which may lead to substantially different
conclusions. For example, an unsafe mine which is constantly needing to satisfy MSHA inspectors with
piecemeal improvements, with concurrent drops in labor productivity, might be said to suffer due to
MSHA regulation. This is obviously a wrong conclusion, since it is suffering due to non-compliance with
regulations, whereas the compliant mines are inspected less frequently, perhaps to the betterment of their
labor productivity.
The third approach mentioned above would be aimed at examining the claim that regulation's primary
effect is to increase the amount of administrative and compliance paperwork, leading to increased labor
devoted to non-mining activity. It is fairly straightforward to examine growth in administrative labor for
mines. Again, this can be compared over time, seeking correlation with enforcement vigor, or across
mines.
As can be seen from the above discussion of methodology, some measure of enforcement level for
SMCRA and MSHA is required. Likely candidates for enforcement effort are: enforcement budget, total
civil penalties collected, number of inspections, and number of citations or violations. The first two are
strictly aggregate numbers: no information exists which provides the total amount spent on inspecting
each individual mine. As such, they would be useful only compared to productivity levels aggregated to
the same level. The latter two proxies are more useful: they are available for each mine for a long but not
exhaustive time-period (1983-1994 as opposed to 1972-1994). Furthermore, they could be aggregated in
the same manner as input and output data are: by region, mining method, and by year. Data at this level
is available only for MSHA enforcement and citation, however. SMCRA data is available at the state
level and, obviously, is exclusive to surface mining.
In Chapter 4, we will discuss the actual methods employed in analyzing the impact of regulation on coal
mines. The efforts focus exclusively on MSHA regulation and enforcement, as this is where data is most
extensive. Regional aggregates, as discussed above, pose several additional problems which tend to make
any results inconclusive.
Summary
In the U.S. coal industry,; productivity has terrific importance. It is primarily important in determining
the price of coal, as it represents shifts in a significant component of the cost of production. It
furthermore is the engine of change for the composition of the industry. Whether a mine will survive or
perish seems to depend a great deal on its level of labor productivity compared to other similar mines in
the region. When examining the coal industry, whether one looks at labor productivity or output, it is
essential to look at a less aggregated level than the usual national figures. At the very least, one should
distinguish between geologically different coal-producing regions and mining method. This will go a
long way to ensure fair comparison of more homogenous groups of suppliers than regional or national
aggregates.
Environmental and health concerns about coal mining resulted in two primary pieces of federal regulation
in the 1970's. These regulations have the effect of mandating certain mining practices and setting
standards for working conditions. To the extent that resources devoted to compliance could have been
used elsewhere in the process, productivity may have been affected. The effects can be broken down into
three broad types. First, the immediate impact on existing mines which are now faced with implementing
new practices and equipment. Second, the administrative burden of complying with the recordkeeping,
testing and inspection requirements of the regulations. Finally, the permanent effect of constraining the
design and operation of new mines which must meet with standards of practice that may be less efficient
from an operational point of view. Different methodologies must be employed to identify each of the three
effects. Our efforts will be focused on the period 1983-1994, long after the initial impacts of the Act have
dissipated. Of the two federal regulations, we rely primarily on data regarding MSHA enforcement, as the
data is more compatible with the operational data at the mine level.
3 The MSHA Dataset
As a result of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (1969), the Mine Safety and Health Administration
was created. The role of this agency is, among others, to maintain records of mine activity in the United
States. The data is gathered from each mine on a quarterly basis, and comprises a wealth of information.
This chapter will provide an overview to the dataset, including definitions for particular terms. As a
check on the validity of the dataset, a comparison is made with established industry-wide data.
Structure of the Dataset
Every mine in the United States is issued an identification number, referred to as the MSHA ID. The
number is unique, and is not re-issued upon closure of the mine. Until the early 1990's, if a mine changed
its mining method from, say, surface operations to underground mining, it would receive a new
identification number. The number of cases where this occurs is quite rare, and the current practice is to
allow the continued use of the same number. A new number is not issued simply for the expansion of an
existing mining operation. The drilling of a neighboring shaft in an underground mine would not be
considered a new mine, so long as it is still part of the same general mining operation. There appears to
be some subjectivity here, and the decision usually rests with the state MSHA official. Generally
speaking, as long as the extension is owned by the same company, is in the same general location, and the
mined coal goes to the same preparation areas and loading areas as the rest of the mine, it is considered
part of the same mine. This is actually beneficial to our analysis, as we are interested in a mining
company's ability to deliver coal from a particular coal deposit, and less interested in whether this entails
deepening existing adits or sinking new shafts.
The MSHA data contains information about the geological nature of the mine: the seam height, amount of
overburden, and other information. This is not part of our analysis, as we are interested in how the
mining operation evolves over time rather than in identifying promising geological characteristics for
mining.
In addition to the geological data, the MSHA dataset contains information on the mining method. For our
analysis, we have grouped all mines into "surface" or "underground" operations, though the MSHA data
gives more exact descriptions about the specific surface or underground method.
At the heart of the dataset is the quarterly information on production and labor usage. This is given for
the various subunits, or stages of the mining process. While output can be expected to come mostly from
the mine-face work (subunit codes 1-4), clearly there is labor involved in other stages as well. The
preparation plant (subunit code 30), the stockyards (subunit code 17), maintenance crews, truck convoys
(in surface mines), and administration (subunit code 99) all serve a purpose and require labor.
Additionally, there may be coal from non-face operations, such as culm bank (subunit code 5) or dredge
operations (subunit code 6).
For our study, we have included non mine-face labor in the calculation of labor input. This is due, again,
to our interest in a mining operation's ability to provide sellable coal, of a particular grade, heat content,
sulfur content and moisture, while at the same time ensuring compliance with applicable laws and
running the business. This is the essence of productivity: the amount of product which is brought to
market - not just extracted - for a given amount of input.
Originally, the data contained over 1.3 million observations, one each for each subunit of each mine for
each quarter of every years from 1972 to 1992. This rather unwieldy amount of data was made more
manageable by summing. total labor and output for all the subunits in each mine, and summing all
quarters to yield one observation per mine per year. This made the data easier to handle, avoiding the
need to extract excessive sub-sets of information, while still retaining all the information necessary for our
analysis. This condensed dataset contains approximately 500,000 observations.
Partitioning the Data
The main premise of this work is that industry aggregates hide a wealth of information. It makes sense,
therefore, to consider a functional partitioning of the data. Since examining each mine on its own is
impracticable, some grouping is necessary, but should still be small enough to identify microlevel trends.
In this analysis, we have grouped the data in three ways: by geographic area, by mining method, and by
vintage.
The smallest geographic grouping that could be performed would be by county. One level up from this
would be groupings by state. Both these groupings were tried in early analyses, but it quickly becomes
clear that, like all natural deposits, coal does not sit nicely within political boundaries. A better approach
is to seek grouping by geological boundaries rather than county or state groupings. Three very clear areas
emerge.
The traditional mining areas of the United States are in the eastern and mid-western states. The
Appalachian 2 states have by far the greatest number of mines, and account for about 40% of all output
today. The Interior3 states, account for about 20% of production, and consist of generally larger mines
than Appalachia, and a higher fraction are surface operations. The Western4 region is heterogeneous mix
of mining conditions, spreading from Arizona to Alaska. There is relatively little underground mining
compared to the other regions. Surface mining is concentrated primarily in Wyoming and Colorado.
Within Wyoming is the Powder River Basin5, which consists of such massive and unique mines that it is
treated as a separate region. Lignite6 mines - exclusively surface operations - are also treated as a distinct
region.
This serves as a good working grouping of mines. Further breakdowns would be possible, especially in
Appalachia where there are different grades of goal, and one might expect that different mines there are
serving different markets. For our purposes, however, the above geographic groupings are sufficient.
When studying the operation of firms in an industry, it is necessary to determine whether or not certain
firms can be grouped at all. While the above geographic groupings can be expected to group mines facing
similar transportation issues, regulations, demand or even some geological features, we need to further
break down the groups according to mining method. The very different nature of the two principal
mining methods - surface and underground - make treating them as if they were the same completely
misleading. Surface mines, for example, usually have much lower amounts of mine-face labor, since the
process is highly mechanized. It essentially involves one operator of a large machine which strips of
layers of earth. Underground mining, however, usually entails several operators working along a coal
seam. It does not lend itself as well to large-scale mechanization. The two very different methods seem to
require that the mines be further grouped accordingly.
Finally, if we are to study the effect of technical progress, we need some measure of the degree of
technological sophistication of a mining operation. This is very difficult to do, and certainly the MSHA
2 Appalachian Region states are Alabama, Georgia, Eastern Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.
3 Interior Region states are Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Western Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, except for Texas lignite mines.
4 Western Region states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, except for Wyoming and Montana surface mines within the Powder
River Basin
5 PRB mines are surface operation in the Northwest counties of Wyoming, plus a few mines in Southern
Montana.
6 Lignite is mined in Texas, North Dakota and Louisiana, plus one mine in Montana. All are surface
mines.
data contains no "technology index" for the given mines. A useful proxy is the year in which the mine
came into operation. If technology progresses in a fairly time-dependent fashion, then the passing of time
becomes a useful indicator as to the amount of technological knowledge associated with the mine. Since,
however, we seek to examine whether technology is somehow fixed in a mine, then the simple passage of
time is not enough: we must vintage each mine, on the possibility that technological progress favors new
mines rather than old mines, as discussed in chapter 2.
So aside from the geographic and mining method breakdowns for the coal mines, we also identify each
mine with a particular vintage, and can (but do not have to) group mines of a particular vintage together.
The vintage of a mine is determined by the first year in which the mine recorded any output, not the first
year it was issued an MSHA ID or the first year some labor was recorded for it. Furthermore, mines
which recorded output in the very first observation of the dataset, 1972, are classified as "pre-existing"
mines, and their vintage cannot be determined.
Test on the Validity of the Data
The data with which we are working is, in essence, the labor and output information at its most basic level
of collection: the individual mines, and subunits therein. As a check on the validity of this data, we can
sum labor and output for-comparison with industry-reported aggregates. These are available on a regional
and national basis, also broken down by mining type.
Figure 3-1 shows output aggregates derived from the MSHA data for our three regions and by mining
method for the years 1972-1992, as well as the values reported by the Energy Information Administration
in their Monthly Energy Review. While the numbers are in close agreement, there is a seemingly
constant discrepancy. Investigations into the EIA's methodology reveals that their figure is the result of
the number of railcars loaded with coal reported by the Association of American Railroads "...converted
into tons of coal by EIA by using the average number of tons of coal per railcar loaded reported in the
most recent [statistics]." This explanation seems not to consider coal transported by truck or conveyor to
ships, though the assumptions utilized which would lead to consistent overestimation of output are
unclear.
Figure 3-1
Figure 3-2 shows that the major source of discrepancy is in the estimate of surface mining output.
Figure 3-2
Figure 3-3 illustrates the discrepancies by mining region.
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Figure 3-3
Beyond comparing output, it is possible also to compare differences in computed mine productivity. This
comparison, again with EIA data, is shown in Figure 3-4.
Figure 3-4
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Whenever an empirical analysis of available data is undertaken, one must be aware of the limitations of
the data. Having compared the MSHA data with the best data otherwise available, it appears that, while
some discrepancies do exist, the same trends and relative movements appear in both sets of data.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the EIA data is inherently more accurate, noting as we
have that these data are derived from a series of estimates, rather than from actual mine-level reporting of
production.
MSHA Enforcement Dataset
Obtained separately from the principal dataset on mine location, description and operating data was the
enforcement dataset. Having already collected the substantial data relating actual mines to ID numbers,
this second dataset needed only to have the unique MSHA ID to allow easy matching to the existing data.
The enforcement data contains information on inspections and citations from 1983 to the present. Since
the primary dataset ends in 1994, enforcement records for 1995 and the first months of 1996 were
discarded.
The structure of the data is, however, somewhat different. Whereas the principal dataset is organized by
quarter, with each unit reporting tons and hours for that quarter, the second dataset reports each
inspection and citation event as it occurs. Therefore, a mine that had seven inspections in a given quarter
will have seven entries in the enforcement dataset, each inspection record indicating the exact beginning
date of the action.
The picture gets even more complicated when dealing with citations. Since multiple citations can arise
from a single inspection, and each citation is reported separately along with the date of the inspection
which lead to the action, several entries may exist which relate to multiple citations resulting from one
inspection.
To make this record structure congruent to that used to track labor productivity requires some
manipulation. First, the number of unique inspection dates within a given year were counted for each
mine. In some instances, this resulted in inspections which are separated by only one day to be counted as
two different inspections. Since we have no a priori knowledge about whether the inspections were part
of a single battery of inspections, we have preferred not to make assumption about whether closely spaced
inspections should really count as a single event. As in other instances where strict rules had to be written
to reflect somewhat subjective categorizations, we have chosen to articulate the rule and apply it as
unambiguously as possible.
There are four different grades of citations indicated in the records. These are codified as 104-A, 104-G,
104-D-1 and 104-D-2, in order of severity of violation. 104-A citations are notices of minor violation.
They are by far the most common of all the citations, and nearly every inspection results in a citation of
this kind. They are issued administratively and are for what is generally characterized as "housekeeping"
offenses. 104-G citations are for the improper training of workers, or for using workers in a capacity for
which they were not trained.
Citations coded 104-D-1 or 104-D-2 are referred to here as "severe citations". They are two different
kinds of "unwarrantable failure" citations. The difference between the two is a function of other
conditions in the mine: a 104-D-2 citation applies if elsewhere in the mine a withdrawal order has been
issued, whereas 104-D-1 is a "first offense" citation. Both are for practices or conditions which imply the
existence of a dangerous condition, which would pose an imminent danger if uncorrected. Examples can
include improper dust suppression, inadequate venting of hazardous (toxic or explosive) gases,
insufficient roofbolting ahd other situations which warrant the closure of the affected section of mine.
We believe that these citation grades are key to establishing the effect of improved safety on mine
productivity. Therefore, for each time period, the number of each type of citation was summed for each
mine.
Finally, this restructured dataset was merged to the existing records. Since the inspection data goes back
only to 1983, a large amount of the data was unaffected. There were a few odd instances where there
existed enforcement data where no production data existed. In some cases, this occurred when a non-
producing mine was inspected, leading to an absence of operating data for that particular year. In a very
small number of cases, the enforcement data was for a mine which was "unknown" to the primary dataset
(i.e. an ID number not encountered anywhere else in the record). Rather than probe possible clerical
errors such as transposed numbers, and given that this occured in fewer than a dozen observations in a
dataset of 120,000 records, these records were discarded.
Summary
The records collected from MSHA represents a wealth of information, as well as a truly challenging data
management task. The information includes descriptive data on the mine such as location, name,
operator, and some guide to the geological conditions such as depth and thickness of seam. For each
subunit within the mine, quarterly data on tons of coal output and person-hours of labor input is recorded.
This data was aggregated on a yearly basis to make the numerical analysis more manageable, and to make
the data more readily comparable to similar data from other sources.
As a check on the validity of the data, the output was compared on a national and regional basis with data
available from the Energy Information Administration. While some discrepancies do exist, the trends
match very closely and, we believe, are an accurate reflection of the operations of the industry.
Finally, as a validation of the applicability of labor productivity data to gain insight into total factor
productivity trends, we offer a comparison of TFP and labor productivity from national data compiled by
Dale Jorgenson. Labor productivity tracks the movements in TFP very closely, though the actual amount
of growth in TFP is smaller than in single factor labor productivity.
The impetus for this research stems from questions which surfaced during aggregate-level studies of the
coal industry. To proceed to a less aggregated analysis, two requirements had to be met. First, a robust
dataset must be assembled. Second, the results from this micro-level analysis must be readily comparable
to aggregate TFP studies. The data we have gathered from MSHA is not only robust, but the labor
productivity analysis which it is used to perform has direct and easily appreciated implications for total
factor productivity.
4 MSHA Enforcement and Productivity
A principal allegation against government regulation stems from the belief that inspections required under
the law reduce productivity in coal mines. This argument is quite distinct from the argument about
whether safe mines are inherently more or less productive. Rather, it alleges that the bureaucratic burden
imposed by government on industry is, irrespective of whether or not a mine is in compliance, a drag on
productivity.
The inspection data which we have from the Mine Safety and Health Administration allows us to
supplement the production information discussed in Chapter 3 with data on the number of inspections
each mine received in a given year, as well as any resulting citations. The inspection records do not go
back as far as the production data, unfortunately - only from 1983 through 1994. This prevents us from
looking closely at the initial-year effects of the Act, during a period of dramatic productivity decline in the
industry. It does, however, offer data during a period of unambiguous growth in productivity. This makes
for quite a compelling piece of analysis: when nearly all sectors of the coal mining industry are improving
steadily, it is easier to isolate effects than during a period like the 1970's which saw massive regional
shifts as well as disparities in productivity.
The first part of this analysis examines the inspection patterns of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. This is an attempt to discern a rationale for allocating scarce inspection resources. One
would expect more frequent inspection of large mines, as more workers will be affected by the conditions
there. Furthermore, MSHA has directions to increase the frequency of inspections in mines with high
levels of methane gas.. The law calls for inspections as often as every week in mines venting more than 1
million cubic feet of methane per day. Other possible factors influencing the frequency of inspection may
include: mine safety history, operator safety history, productivity level, mining method and geographic
region.
The analysis then turns to examining, at the mine level, inspection frequency, citation incidence, and
productivity level. This can be accomplished by looking at various mines in a given time period, and
identifying any relationships that seem to exist between the factors. As far as possible, we should compare
mines which are as similar as possible with regard to size, mining method, and geographic region to
better isolate the effect of inspection effort.
Care must be exercised when specifying the regression model to better quantify the relationship.
Specifically, scale effects and the dependence between citations and inspections make it more difficult to
include in the model variables which represent only one effect. For example, all citations require an
inspection -hence implicit in the effect of a citation will be the burden imposed by the inspection alone.
These issues of choice of specification are discussed more fully in this chapter.
As the analysis of the impact of inspections and citations on mine productivity requires an understanding
of scale-related effects on inspection effort and productivity, some insight is also gained into what, if any,
advantages are realized by making mining operations a particular size. As expected, this will depend on
mining method as well as the geological conditions.
Inspections Under MSHA
The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act rose out of concern about collapses and explosions in underground
mines. Given the nature of the Act, it is hardly surprising that the vast majority of inspections are
concentrated in the Appalachian region - home to the greatest number of underground mines. The
Interior has the second-highest number of underground mines, and this is reflected in the number of safety
inspections in that region's mines. The West has the fewest underground mines of all, whereas both the
Powder River Basin and Lignite mines are exclusively surface mining operations, and consist of relatively
few mines. Figure 4-1 shows the incidence of MSHA inspections in each of these regions.
Figure 4-1
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Looking at the number of inspections by method, we again see the great priority given to underground
mines. They make up fully 73% of all inspections under the Act. This is shown in Figure 4-2, below.
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Different Measures of Inspection Effort
While comparing total inspections in a given region will tell us something about the spatial allocation of
inspection effort by MSHA, it does not say much about any effects on the mining process. One way to
approach the issue of inspection burden is to look at the number of inspections at a given mine. This
measure is shown for the eight regions in Figure 4-3.
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Unlike the initial impression that Appalachia has the heaviest amount of inspection, this calculus
indicates that it is the underground mines in the Interior and West which are inspected most heavily.
Appalachian underground mines receive about one-third the number of yearly inspections that their
Interior region counterparts get.
This is clearly not the whole story, however. It merely says that inspection effort is not equal on a per-
mine basis. Nor is there any reason to think it should. Appalachian mines are usually smaller than those
in the Interior, which tend to be large operations. In 1985, for example, underground mines in
Appalachia had an average output of 86,600 short tons per mine compared to 727,000 short tons for those
in the Interior - a difference of approximately 8:1.
The comparison above suggests a second way of looking at the allocation of inspections effort: inspections
per ton of output. Figure 4-4 shows this comparison.
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The pattern seen here is quite different from the per-mine measures. First of all, Appalachian
underground mines seem to bear the brunt of the inspection. Second, this figure falls dramatically during
the eleven years under study for the Appalachian mines, and less dramatically for the other underground
mining regions.
We now encounter a problem of causality. Are the MSHA inspectors "backing off' the Appalachian
underground operators during this time, or is rising average per-mine output the real reason why per-ton
inspections are falling? Clearly, the answer is a mix of the two.
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We can look at inspection concentrations in yet another way: inspections per hour of labor. This is
somewhat analogous to the per-ton measure in that it captures increased inspection at bigger mines. It
suffers from the same ambiguity as the previous measure, also - the exact cause for the variations cannot
be discerned. Figure 4-5 shows the regional per-hour inspection trends.
Figure 4-5
While trying to understand the logic behind allocation of inspection effort may be interesting, the central
question remains unanswered - how is labor productivity affected? The question of which measure to use
is one we will return to when specifying the regression model. For now, suffice it to say that underground
mines usually have higher inspections than surface mines, and that larger mines receive more inspections
than smaller mines. Keep in mind, also, that inspections can arise from complaints by workers, as a result
of previous citations for certain problems, and due to particular hazards unique to a given mine (such as
methane venting).
Regional Labor Productivity Figures
Having attained a good level of understanding about inspection efforts in the various coal-producing
regions, we turn now our attention to labor productivity trends in the same eight areas. At this stage, we
are still simply exploring the data, looking for indications about what may warrant further analysis.
Figures 4-6 through 4-8 show productivity trends for 1983-1994. The first two figures show absolute
levels, though the second figure excludes PRB and Lignite mines in order to allow closer examination of
MSHA Inspections by Region
A.~u ---UGAPP
...... .... ..
' 2.OEI0I I-I-I- UIWI
S2.0604
g 1.5E04
1.0•04 -
- O.OE04-
U .~0
Cf) V 10 0 r_ 00 0) 0 T_ CM~oo Go CO M o 00 (0o 0 0 0) 0 0 - IG
0) • 0O 0 0D 0 O 0 0 0) OD 0) 0)T_ ýr- V_ Ir. V_ T_ Ir- V_ V_T_ V_ T_
-- UGAPP
---- UGWX
-SAPP
...... ,•-ol- UGINT
- SNT
SWX
- PRF
the lower-productivity regions. The third figure normalizes all productivity levels to equal 1.0 at 1983.
This allows comparison of relative growth rates as opposed to levels.
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Productivity by Region
(Excluding PRB and Lignite)
Figure 4-7
Productivity index (1983=1.0) by region
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Figure 4-8
There are several interesting and potentially important features of the graphs above. Before delving into
any kind of analysis, however, it is useful to examine the choice of metric which will be employed to
measure inspection vigor on the part of MSHA. For this, it is useful to consider the following example.
Choice of Metric
A likely candidate for further examination is the underground Appalachian group of mines. While on a
per-mine and per-hour basis these mines were subject to a relatively constant inspection rate, the growth
in labor productivity lead to an ever-decreasing per-ton inspection burden. In fact, here the correlation
seems quite good. Per-hour inspections fell in 1986, a year when productivity grew somewhat faster than
previously. In 1993, the inspection rate per ton grew, reversing a long trend of falling rates.
Interestingly, that same year productivity virtually stagnated.
While the Appalachian experience may seem to support the argument of productivity-dampening effects
of inspections, it is really an unavoidable consequence of how the measures were donstructed. If
inspections in a given mine are roughly constant, then each time productivity surges, the per-ton measure
of inspection effort will, by construction, fall. Since inspections were fairly constant for the Appalachian
region during the years studied, and productivity did account for most increases in output (as opposed to
increase labor usage), then the per-ton level of MSHA inspections had to track productivity change.
Hence, this cannot be seen as evidence supporting any relationship between productivity or regulatory
enforcement.
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The above example raises the question of the appropriate measure of inspection effort. It is perhaps
easiest to explain by looking at the order of production steps in coal mining. Labor is the key input
controlled by the mine operator. Given a certain anticipated demand, the mine operator will devote the
amount of labor believed to be required to produce the desired level of output. The link between the two
is, obviously, labor productivity. If one is to look at the influence of inspection effort on labor
productivity, one would want a measure relating to how inspection affected the inputs to the process,
rather than some sort of ex post or realized measure. The difference is precisely that between per-hour
and per-ton measures of inspection rates. A greater per-hour rate may indicate a greater burden on the
production process, which will in turn be expected to affect labor productivity which will lead to an
altered amount of output. The per-ton measure is a post-production measure, in itself dependent on the
labor productivity which, it is argued, will be affected by that very rate. To better separate the factors
influencing labor input and its productivity, it seems that the per-hour or per-mine measures provide a
cleaner measure which is more representative of its perceived effects.
Some Observations
First, if we want to discern an effect on productivity of inspections, an obvious candidate is UGWX
(underground Western mines), which experienced elevated inspection rates during 1987-1989. Both on a
per-mine and per-hour basis, these years indicate inspection rates up to 30% higher than the apparent
1983-1994 levels for that region.
Interestingly, these years are not at all out of the ordinary regarding labor productivity. The eleven-year
period shows steady growth, with some apparent cyclicality leading to accelerated growth in the years
1987, 1991, and 1994. The 1987-89 period of heightened MSHA inspection effort is not clearly reflected,
and indeed is somewhat contradicted, by the productivity data. In 1987, the first year of higher inspection
frequency, labor productivity increased 25%. In 1989, when inspection frequency returned to "normal"
levels, labor productivity grew only modestly at 10% - compared to an eleven-year average growth of
9.6% per year. The evidence from this region seems to weaken the claim that increased inspection effort
reduces labor productivity.
To more formally analyze the effects of inspection effort on labor productivity, a regression model was
developed. The model is aimed at obtaining two effects related to inspections. First, to establish the
relationship between changes in inspection level for a given region over time. Secondly, to examine the
potential relationship between inter-region differences in inspection effort and differences in labor
productivity.
Regional Analysis
In this first instance, we treat each method-region as a distinct set of observations, with no relation to the
other regions. We simply seek to model labor productivity within that region over the eleven years 1983-
1994. Explanatory variables are time, measured in calendar years and the number of inspections per
mine. A constant is included in the regression, relating to the level of productivity in the absence of
inspection (at some hypothetical year zero). A log-form specification is chosen, as growth is usually
modeled as an exponential growth function
Productivity = e ( + ~I c)
where t is time, I is inspection effort, and C is a constant such that ec is some base level of productivity.
The simple regression then takes the form
In(PRDCTY) = a -YEAR + P1. INSPECT + CONST + e
A summary of the regression results is given below.
Table 4-1 Regional Aggregate Regression Results
YEAR INSPECT CONST
0.048
(17.444)
0.066
(23.763)
0.055
(13.758)
0.064
(30.069)
0.046
(11.220)
0.067
(12.213)
0.011(1.144)
0.094
(23.024)
-0.020
(-0.956)
-0.019
(-1.990)
-0.034
(-1.394)
0.004
(2.085)
0.007
(0.510)
-0.026
(-1.030)
0.022
(1.144)
0.002
(0.627)
-93.603
(-17.458)
-129.927
(-23.763)
-107.801
(-13.712)
-126.422
(-29.765)
-90.321
(-10.917)
-130.669
(-12.000)
-21.064
(-1.453)
-186.292
(-22.935)
Adj-R2 Obs.
0.9863 12
0.9818
0.9564 12
0.9883 12
0.9371 12
0.9450 12
0.6066 12
0.9807 12
The most notable aspect of these results is that the number of per-mine inspections is only significant in
one region, underground Interior, and here the relationship is weakly positive. The rest of the results
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indicate no clear effect of the number of per-mine inspections - even the sign of the relationship is highly
questionable. Yet the adjusted-R2 measure is very high.
An immediate suspect is the level at which the analysis was performed: essentially regional averages for
output, labor, and inspections. As seen in the earlier figures, productivity measured at the regional level is
fairly consistently increasing, and therefore easily fit to an exponential growth function such as was
specified. Additional variations may be explained by enforcement effort, but the role of the explanatory
variable inspections per-mine is not clear. At this aggregate level, inspections per mine is influenced not
just by changes in the regional enforcement effort, but by changing composition of mines in the region.
Furthermore, since we know that a determining factor in allocating enforcement effort is the size of the
mine, an increase in per-mine inspections could actually be reflecting increasing mine size in the region.
If there are scale effects of labor productivity - bigger mines are somewhat more productive - then a
positive coefficient on inspections per mine would be reasonable in a region experiencing growth in
average mine size. In the underground Interior region, this is exactly what occurred in the time period
examined: output increased from 55 million tons in 1980 to 69 million in 1994, while the number of
mines dropped from 84 to 68.
This is hardly a clear picture of how enforcement affects mine productivity, but rather an acknowledgment
that productivity is tied up in a complex interaction of size, region, age, technology and possibly
regulatory enforcement. To better clarify these interactions, two possibilities exist: account for
compositional shifts in mine size (both in terms of output and labor), number of mines, and changes in
inspection frequency, or conduct the analysis at the mine level. Performing the analysis at the mine level
eliminates many of the compositional problems: there are no averages, and hence no need to separate the
different ways in which an average can be affected, such as the enforcement per-mine metric. Some
problems are left unresolved, however. For example, the relationship between scale and productivity will
still be embedded in any figures of inspections per mine, since inspections are indicative of size.
Mine-Level Analysis
As we delve into a more complex analysis involving mine-level data, we must revisit the earlier issue of
measuring inspection enforcement and the effect of scale. In particular, we seek a better understanding of
how strong the relationship actually is, rather than relying on intuitive feelings that the relationship may
be important.
Scale Effects on Productivity and Inspections
Below is a set of nine graphs, three years in each of three underground mining regions. The first set are
scatterplots of productivity against mine output.
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The above figure shows, for the three underground coal-mining regions, the distribution of labor
productivity against size for three years: 1985, 1990, and 1994. In the West there appears to be quite a
clear relationship. The matter is less clear in the Interior and Appalachian mines.
Also important is the relationship between inspection effort and size of a mine. As for the productivity-
scale relationship, above, a set of plots is given below. The relationship seems to be clearer here.
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Developing an Econometric Model
It is most important to examine the different specifications of potential models, as the results, and hence
the conclusions drawn, will be affected by the choice of explanatory variables.
A main concern is separating size effects from operational effects. Both tons produced and labor hours
used can be used to gauge both effects. Since mines exhibit some variation in labor productivity with size,
it may seem prudent to introduce tons of output into the model. However, productivity has been defined as
tons per miner-hour. The positive returns to larger operation will not be separated from the algebraic fact
that, all things being equal, productivity will increase if tonnage increases. Similarly for labor hours:
bigger mines use more labor, implying a positive return to increased labor (due to scale), but negative
returns since, for a given amount of output, higher labor usage implies lower labor productivity.
An alternative way to separate scale and operating effects is to use dummy variables to identify mines by
their size. In this fashion, one could identify mines in, say, the 50th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentile by
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II I_ III_ _ I
0.IrO O
. -
a@*
ova
"M
output. More specifically, these percentiles would be calculated for each year, by each of the three
underground regions. In this manner, we incorporate scale effects with "labels" as opposed to using the
tonnage or labor usage data. In Appendix A-2 the reader will find the relevant percentile brackets by
tonnage, noting that these are shown for all years taken together, rather than on a year-by-year basis as
was done for the calculations.
In this model, dummy variables are introduced for the constant (to account for different levels of
productivity among sizes) and as intercepts on the year counter (to account for different rates of growth).
The inspection effort and citations is treated as the same for all mines.
In the model as specified, we can separate and distinguish between the effects of inspections and that of
safety. Safety is measured by CITSVR, which is the total of "unwarrantable failure" citations for a mine,
issued in cases of imminent endangerment of workers. CIT1 and CIT2 are lesser offenses, with CIT1
being a very mild administrative citation for violations such as unremoved roof-fall - patently non-life
threatening occurrences. CIT2 is a citation for the use of untrained workers in a particular area. More on
the interpretation of the various implied relationships between the different citation grades is included in
the discussion section, below.
The model used takes the following form:
In(PRDCTY) = a, T5OYR+ a2T90YR+ a3T95YR+ a4T99YR+
AiT50 + f 2T90 + a 3T95 + f34T99 + y,INSPECT +
72CIT1 + yCIT2 + y4CITSVR
where T(#)YR are the various coefficients on time for the four percentile divisions, T(#) are the intercept
dummies for the four percentiles, and INSPECT is inspections per mine. CITI, CIT2 and CITSVR are
three different grades of citation.
The results, by region, are given in the tables below, first for underground mines, then for surface mines.
Underground Mines
Table 4-2 Regression Results for Underground Mines
Region Percentile
Appalachia 50
90
95
99
Interior 50
90
95
99
West
YEAR Intercent INSPECT
1 TIC 
CIT2 
CITSVR
0.015 0.65 0.002 -0.005 -0.048 -0.011
(9.51) (57.91) (3.14) (-5.24) (-3.35) (-3.71)
0.043 0.75
(24.85) (58.20)
0.081 0.39
(16.32) (10.94)
0.071 0.44
(12.85) (10.81)
0.049 0.576 0.002 -0.006 -0.073 -0.032
(7.60) (11.96) (1.08) (-2.70) (-1.28) (-3.43)
0.062 0.708
(8.72) (11.07)
0.051 0.832
(2.53) (5.31)
0.072 0.608
(3.098) (3.52)
0.076
(7.37)
0.095
(8.49)
0.110
(3.58)
0.067
(1.81)
0.386
(5.21)
0.864
(10.02)
1.076
(4.72)
1.360
(5.41)
0.003
(0.97)
-0.014 0.023 -0.022
(-3.19) (0.32) (-1.89)
These results indicate a negligible effect of increased per-mine inspection effort. Citations, however, do
seem to have a greater effect. In Appalachian mines, those with higher levels of citations, regardless of
severity, have lower productivity. In the Interior, severe violations have a high correspondence with
lowered productivity. In the West, citations again seem to influence productivity adversely, though the t-
statistics are not as high.-
Also interesting are the implications of scale for labor productivity. In the West, productivity levels are
clearly increase with mine size. This is also true in Interior, except for the very biggest mines which are
somewhat lower. No such clear pattern emerges in Appalachia.
Growth in labor productivity exhibits some increases in scale, though no clear relationship emerges
indicating that larger mines will grow faster. In the Western underground mines, for example, the largest
4% of the mines (between the 95th and 99th percentiles) have the lowest rate of growth, lower even than
the smaller 50% of mines. In Appalachia there appears to be a clearer positive return to scale, with the
smallest 50% of mines growing, on average, 1.5% per year in terms of labor productivity, whereas the
90th and 95th percentile mines experienced growth in labor productivity of 4.3% and 8.1%, respectively.
Ad-R 
Obs
0.7762 14982
0.8362 659
0.8147 445
It is only in the largest 4% of mines (between the 95th and 99th percentiles) that there appears to be a
negative effect of size to labor productivity growth, as they grew at a more modest but still high 7.0% per
year. The Interior offers a real puzzle with no discernible pattern present.
Surface Mines
Using the same specification as for the three underground regions, a similar analysis can be executed for
the five surface mining regions. We anticipate more unexplained behavior in the surface mining regions
than in the underground ones. One major reason is the relatively minor amount of inspection effort
expended by MSHA on surface mines. This is expected and justified since the Coal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1969 was geared primarily towards underground mines. Additionally, surface mines are
subject to additional regulatory requirements which are absent from underground mines. The lower
applicability of our data, as well as the lack of what is quite possibly a major factor of surface labor
productivity, make the analysis of MSHA regulation on surface mines less meaningful.
Once again, the data was partitioned into the 50th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles by tonnage for each
year and each region (Appalachia, Interior, West, Lignite and Powder River Basin). As before, this is to
capture scale effects without relying on operational data which directly influences the labor productivity
calculations. The regression results are shown below.
Table 4-3 Regression Results for Surface Mines
Re•oinn
Percentile
--- n-- - -... .. .
Appalachia 50
90
95
99
Interior 50
90
95
99
West
r aeY 
CONST 
INSPECT
CIT1 CIT2 CITSVR
0.016 0.781 0.000 -0.006 0.029 -0.005
(6.42) (43.50) (-0.02) (-0.95) (1.31) (-0.31)
0.033 0.900
(13.10) (46.59)
0.057 0.969
(8.32) (20.28)
0.057 0.984
(7.59) (0.052)
0.029 0.819 0.014 -0.034 0.035 -0.172
(5.18) (18.87) (1.29) (-2.62) (0.86) (-4.84)
0.058 0.919
(9.74) (19.15)
0.053 1.116
(3.27) (9.94)
0.050 1.133
(2.74) (8.87)
0.006
(0.37)
0.022
(0.59)
-0.15
(-0.29)
-0.334
(-2.64)
-0.402
(1.63)
0.023
(0.061)
-0.004 -0.027 0.088 0.047
(-0.17) (-0.94) (0.85) (0.59)
Adj R Obs.
0.7800 9796
0.8081 1689
0.9174 289
99
Lignite 50
90
95
99
PRB 50
90
95
99
0.020 1.991
(0.49) (6.70)
0.095 1.303 -0.017 -0.057 -0.020 -0.042
(7.06) (10.98) (-0.59) (-1.62) (-0.15) (-0.69)
0.030 2.230
(1.88) (17.07)
0.089 1.872
(1.73) (5.20)
0.023 1.818
(0.09) (2.49)
0.010 0.919 0.175 0.134 0.212 0.122
(0.38) (4.38) (2.06) (1.57) (0.76) (0.51)
0.065 1.102
(2.80) (6.12)
-0.017 0.928
(-0.37) (2.70)
0.072 0.941
(1.70) (2.89)
As expected, there is scant evidence supporting the claim that either citations or inspection under MSHA
reduces productivity for surface mines. The one notable exception is the impact of severe citations in the
Interior. This seems amply countered by the Powder River Basin, where there is seemingly nothing that
can be done to slow the pace of productivity growth in this extraordinary coal-producing region.
The effects of scale seem stronger than for underground mines. In Appalachia and the Interior, there is
clear evidence that larger mines have higher labor productivity. The Lignite and PRB regions both have
rather similar levels across all sizes. The Western surface mines are a true curiosity: the entire region is
apparently buoyed by the largest mines, which are achieving modest growth in labor productivity at best.
Once again, the evidence linking growth rates in productivity to size is somewhat weak. Examples exist,
as in Appalachia and the Interior, where scale does seem to affect the rate of growth. The other three
regions, however, show no such link.
Determining Causation
The above analysis is strong evidence that their is a correlation between increased citation incidence and
depressed labor productivity in underground mines. The mechanism through which this occurs is not
clear. Indeed, the analysis does not speak at all about the direction of causation. The two competing
explanations can be summed up as follows:
"The Benign Citation Hypothesis" - In this construction, a citation is an indicator of mining practice
and nothing more. There is assumed to be complete independence between productivity and a citation,
and any correlation between the two must lie in a third linkage: mining practice. Under this reasoning,
0.9349 236
0.9129 263 0.9129 
263
the evidence that high-productivity mines have low citations shows that good operating practice is
necessary to attain high levels of labor productivity. The same practices which lead to efficient mining
also protect the health and safety of workers.
"The Citation Feedback Hypothesis" - This view of the production process holds that labor productivity
is a realized measure given a bounded allocation of productive resources. While all mines must comply
with the relevant laws, mines that have had citations - and especially those citations requiring some action
on the part of the operator - will be further constrained in their ability to allocate labor and capital
efficiently. Hence, lowered productivity in the presence of high citations has more to do with the
regulatory burden of the citation rather than the operating conditions which lead to the citation in the first
place.
While further in this section some analytical techniques are discussed which can further the investigation
of causality, there are some first-attempt exercises which may shed some light on the question. First, one
would want to establish the degree of independence between citations and inspections. While the data we
have suggests that all inspections lead to some kind of citation, there are several cases of multiple citations
arising from a single inspection. Furthermore, we have identified at least four different kinds of citation.
These observations should be enough to allow citations to be distributed independently from the
distribution of inspections, beyond the obvious fact that each citation must stem from an inspection.
The argument immediately becomes complicated when we re-visit the relationship with mine size.
Recalling that there seems to be some labor productivity return to scale in mines, and that inspection effort
is influenced by the amount of labor used in a mine, it is imperative that our analysis of citations be
constructed in such a manner that we truly isolate the effect of the citation alone. That is, we must ensure
that we are looking at the effect of a citation given that a given number of inspections have already
occurred, rather than observing the cumulated effects of all actions leading up to a citation.
This again raises the crucial question of choice of metric. Clearly the use of citations per mine is
inadequate, since this will have a lower bound equal to the number of inspections, which we already
determined is largely a function of mine size. Citations per hour of labor input suffers from additional
problems. First, MSHA carries out a minimum of four inspection in each underground mine. Hence
there is a lower limit on inspections - and therefore citations - whereas no such lower bound exists for
labor hours. This will lead to many smaller mines which receive the minimum number of inspections but
have vastly different labor inputs reflected as a tremendous scatter in citations per hour for small mines.
Furthermore, for a given level of citations per hour, it would be impossible to differentiate between a mine
which achieved that level due to unsafe conditions, or a relatively safe mine which garnered many
inspection due to its size. Most of these problems apply particularly to the 104-A, or CITI, citations,
which are the most common.
A third potential metric is citations per inspection. This allows us to explore the amount of auto-
correlation between an inspection and a citation for the various grades, as well as controlling for size-
effects which are embodied in the number of inspections. Additionally, it identifies mines which have a
low number of citations due to low number of inspections rather than because it was particularly safe.
Figure 4-11 shows the correlation between labor productivity and total citations for underground mines.
Figure 4-11
This is not particularly convincing either way. All it seems to say is that inspectors do not appear to be
influeneced by the relative productivity of a mine in their determinations of citable offenses. More
indicative, perhaps, is the distribution of severe citations, as shown in Figure 4-12 for underground mines.
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Figure 4-12
Again, this is not overwhelming evidence for either case. Simply put, mine productivity does not seem
unduly affected by the number of citations arising from an inspection. We must now turn to the original
allocation of inspections for possible explanations, shown below in Figure 4-13.
Figure 4-13
Figure 4-13 lends support to the idea that it is the frequency of inspections that identifies the heavily-cited
mines. In other words, most of the variation is attributable to repeated inspections than highly variable
citations per inspection. Unfortunately, this leaves us no closer to an answer. The relatively narrow range
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of severe citations per inspection could either indicate a certain "quota" mentality on behalf of the
inspectors, or that all conditions in a mine that may be deemed dangerous are reported in some grouped
fashion. In other words, no matter how dangerous the conditions in a mine may be, it might simply not be
possible to issue dozens of citations on that one occasion. Recall also that conditions constituting an
"imminent danger" are not cited in the procedure outlined here, but are dealt with under a separate part of
the Coal Act.7 Another point worthy of note is that the citations per inspection number is derived from
dividing the sum of all citations for the year by the sum of all inspections. It is not an average of the
actual citations per inspection for each inspection.
Other possibilities abound. Inspections are allocated, among other things, by the past history of
violations. Indeed, a citation may often require a follow-up inspection. In a sense, then, inspections are
as much a result of past inspections as they are of other factors already discussed. A regression of the
number of inspections on several factors, including the number of severe citations experienced in the
previous period, indicates this quite clearly.
Table 4-4 Regression of Number of Inspections
t50 t90 t95 t99 PRDCTY Inspect Severe Obs. Adjusted RW
(t-1) Cit (t-l)
2.612 4.373 7.466 13.89 -0.064 0.542 1.106 12075 0.7088
12.30 17.48 17.65 28.15 -0.94 66.42 17.74
The occurrence of a severe citation in the previous year appears to increase the number of inspections in
the current year by slightly more than one, with a very high level of significance. Interestingly, there is a
great degree of serial correlation with the number of inspections in the previous period. This may be due
to the fact that mine size and geological conditions do not change much, and hence there is little variation
in the "base" number of inspections each year. Variations from this longer-term average, however, seem
to be explained, at least partially, by the safety record of the mine. Notice, also, that labor productivity
does not appear to contribute to the number of inspections.
The causation issue is far from resolved, then. What is clear is that the allocation of inspections seems to
correlate more closely with the observed variations in productivity that do other measures such as citations
per inspection. This appears to be due, at least in part, to the safety record of the mine in the previous
7 § 107 "Procedures to Counteract Dangerous Conditions" allows an inspector to immediately "...cause all
persons...to be withdrawn from, and to be prohibited from entering, such area..." This is in stark
contrast to the usual citation procedures which require an operator to correct a dangerous situation, failure
to do so being possible grounds for a similar withdrawal order.
year. Inspection effort, then, is not a benign starting point, but rather an allocation which in itself reflects
the relative safety of the mines in question. Both explanations for the productivity - citation relationship
can still be asserted. The "benign citation" followers will then be encouraged to know that MSHA is
being highly efficient in chasing up known unsafe operators, as the law requires. Alternatively, the
"perpetual citation machine" advocates will point to the double-insult of being inspected often: it will
inevitably lead to higher inspections.
Further Analytical Issues in This Research
The difficult conceptual and econometric modeling issues involved in establishing any kind of causal
relationship between productivity and regulatory enforcement pose a variety of challenges for further
research.
This analysis thus far does not support either of the two views set forth in the previous section regarding
the causation mechanism surrounding enforcement of the Coal Act. The first hypothesis states that good
operating practice is the key to high productivity, whereas the second theory bestows upon MSHA officials
the key to mine productivity. Frankly, it is difficult to see how a citation which imposes almost negligible
monetary penalties on an operator ($50 is the standard fine)8 and entails no interruption of production
could have a large effect on productivity, though one would hardly want to draw conclusion from an
inability to envision a relationship.
Further analysis may shed light on the causation question. In particular, we would want to separate the
function of the citation figures as an indicator of mine management practice from its potential role as a
productivity drag. If the citation itself was the cause of productivity loss, then including a current citation
counter as well as a counter of the previous period's citations would reveal the role of citations in
determining productivity in the ensuing period. Since the temporal effects of citations are sought, using
the original quarterly data for selected mines would be very beneficial. Second, one would want to include
some measure of a citation frequency's deviation from the longer-term average. The underlying
assumption is that management practice does not generally change much from quarter to quarter, and that
the long-term management practice will be reflected in the long-run trend in citations. By including a
linear and quadratic citation term in the regression, we would capture the effect of quarterly deviations
from the longer trend. In other words, the linear term would reflect the citation level associated with
operating practice, and the quadratic term would capture the more sporadic or capricious citation behavior
of the inspectors.
8 MSHA Fact Sheet 95-4, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAFCT4.HTM
As the other kinds of citation entail more severe penalties and are for more dangerous practices, there is
less ambiguity or scope for judgment or subjectivity on the part of the inspectors. The amount of training
a worker has is a fairly precise measure9, as is the nature of the work being done by that worker.
Similarly, unwarrantable failures due to high levels of dust, toxic or explosive gas, or lack of structural
support are subjected to measurable standards. The 104-G and 104-D citations, then, are less prone to
abuse or variation from one inspector to another, and more likely to be true reflections of the conditions at
a mine.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether it is inherently unsafe practices which are a drag on
productivity, or the price MSHA extracts for non-compliance. Unlike the 104-A citations, the 104-D
variety leads to a closure of a mine section'0 . The question is how much will this affect productivity?
Since miners must be paid for their time at regular wages, perhaps the workers will simply be moved to an
open section of the mine. The effect of a shutdown will also be determined by its duration and the relative
amount of output for which that section accounts. Again, some further analysis on a quarterly basis with
some more sophisticated choice of variables may be illuminating.
The role that mine injury data could play is very promising. It would be possible, for instance, so test
whether there is a relationship between injuries and future inspection effort. Furthermore, one could
establish whether mines receiving low numbers of citations were indeed safe operators or simply had
slipped detection by MSHA. The data is available, and its integration into the analysis should be a top
priority.
Summary
Inspection effort by MSHA is allocated with emphasis on underground mines, with the larger mines being
subject to more inspections than smaller mines. Mines with particular characteristics, such as high
presence of methane, will receive even more inspections. Mines also are subject to inspection if there has
been a worker complaint, as follow-up inspections to previous citations, or if, in MSHA's judgment, the
mine's safety record warrants more careful inspection.
When analyzed on a regional basis, results can be obscured by structural shifts in the industry within a
particular region. All three measures of inspection effort -per-mine, per-ton, and per-hour - are a
9 The Coal Act requires 40 hours for new underground miners (§1 15(a)(1)), 24 hours for new surface
miners (§ 1 15(a)(2)) and eight hours of refresher courses at least every 12 months(§ 115(a)(3)).
0o This is somewhat misleading. Repeated 104-A citations can lead to a withdrawal of workers, though
this is rare.
function not only of inspection vigor on the part of the Administration, but also of changing composition -
number of mines, average mine size, and productivity of these mines. Since the period examined has been
one where some regions have experienced considerable growth in output, a general diminution of the
number of mines, and increased labor productivity, the variations in the different inspection metrics make
analyses based on regional aggregates unreliable. Mine-level analysis is required.
When specifying a mine-level regression model, care must be taken to separate operational effects
(relating small changes in labor usage and output to labor productivity) and scale effects (where labor may
have increasing returns to scale). In this analysis, the effects were separated by partitioning the mines in
the given region into those falling below the 50th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentile. This non-uniform
partitioning is due to the highly skewed distribution of mine output, where a traditional quartile would
lead to grouping mines which differ in output by one or more orders of magnitude. Each size group is
allowed an independent time coefficient and intercept. All mines are presumed to be equally affected by
inspections and citations.
The results indicate that underground mines are significantly and adversely affected by increased
citations, but inspections do not, in and of themselves, seem to affect mine performance. This is a result
requiring some deeper thinking due to the fact that all citations arise from an inspection. In fact, one
would expect perfect colinearity to exist were it not for the fact that one inspection can lead to multiple
citations. What the coefficient on INSPECT really means, in this case, is that it is no worse to received a
given number of citations from a large number of inspections than if all arose from a single inspection. In
other words, for a given number of citations, the number of inspections is immaterial.
The more interesting result is the profound effect of citations on mine productivity. The severe citations
seem to lower labor productivity by 1 to 3% per additional citation, depending on the region. The
untrained worker and basic citations have varying degrees of effect. Recall, also, that the base citation,
being the most frequent one, will also reflect the impact of inspection as well as the influence of operating
practice on labor productivity.
For surface mines, inspections and citations under MSHA were rarely significant determinants of labor
productivity. This may be due to MSHA's relatively minor role in surface mining operations, compared to
the surface mining regulations which are more prevalent.
Causation remains enigmatic. There is every indication that citations do not come about as an
independent result of observing mine practices, but rather depend on the initial allocation of inspection
effort. In turn, this effort seems to be influenced by past safety and citation history. This is due largely to
requirements for follow-up inspections when some citations are issued, as well as to the discretion allowed
MSHA officials which permits consideration of general safety record when allocating inspection effort."
Further analysis utilizing quarterly rather than yearly data, coupled with more refined modeling of the
effects of citation, may prove helpful in improving our understanding of the mechanism through which
productivity and citations are related. An important body of information which would help resolve the
issue is mine injury data.
The effects of scale on level and growth of labor productivity, too, are illuminating. The scale effect is
most pronounced in surface mining, where both Appalachian and Interior surface mines show positive
returns to scale. The Powder River Basin and Lignite mines also show some of this effect, but these
regions consist of mines which are consistently very large: there simply are no small operations there.
Growth rates do not follow scale quite as neatly, though in most regions the larger 50% of mines
outperform the smaller half. The case for underground scale effects is less strong, but again the bigger
half of mines tends to have higher levels and growth rates of labor productivity than the smaller 50%.
"§ 103 (a) "The Secretary shall develop guidelines for additional inspections...based on criteria
including, but not limited to, the hazards found in mines...and his experience..."
5 Policy Analysis and Conclusions
In the arena of government regulation of industries rages an age old debate. Central to the debate are
contending views regarding the best program for promoting health, safety, and environmental
responsibility while limiting the interference of government in private industry. In the case of coal
mining, the industry's inability to adequately protect the health and safety of miners in subsurface mines,
and a failure to prevent aesthetic deterioration and contamination in surface mines lead to pressure at the
federal and state levels to subject the industry to government regulation. The Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969 (amended as the Mine Act in 1977) and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 are the regulatory creations that arose from that pressure.
In this chapter, we develop a broader picture of the effects of the Coal Act (1969), both in terms of impact
on industry and its relative success in achieving greater protection for miners. Initially, two different
ways of examining impacts on regulations are introduced: by type of impact and whether the events are
expected to be permanent or not. Once this research is place in context, other areas meriting further work
are discussed, and the results of this analysis summarized.
Industry Response to Regulation
The effects of the regulations can be analyzed chronologically or by category of effect. Broadly speaking,
one would expect the initial effects of requiring existing mines to comply with regulation would differ in
nature from the effects experienced by mines a decade later. This would be due to the penetration of
compliance among the pre-regulation group, and the introduction of new mines since passage of the laws.
These two effects are referred to as "transitional" and "continuous".
In addition to the temporal nature of the effects, one might describe at least two types of effect.
First, the actual practice modification requirements imposed on the industry will required both time and
resources to implement. Second, ensuring compliance will require a certain amount of intrusion and
perhaps interruption of the mining operations to allow for full inspections. Furthermore, the mine
operator does not have full knowledge or warning regarding the frequency, date, or extent of all
inspections - if they did, one may expect an ability to anticipate and plan around these events. Indeed, the
Coal Act stipulates that spot inspections be conducted at irregular intervals 12 and provides for criminal
and civil penalties against people who leak a notice of inspection to operators. 13
To put things into a policy analysis framework, one would want to fully articulate, if not quantify, the
effects of the regulation. This would, at a bare minimum, entail assessing the burden of compliance on
the industry in terms of lost output due to inspection-induced "downtime", direct cost of altering operating
practice and equipment to comply with the regulation, and the increased operating cost due to practices
required by the law. Of course, one must also examine whether the goals of the regulation have been met,
and to what extent. In the case of the Coal Act, one would look at figures for fatal accidents and
respiratory problems, though the latter will often not manifest itself for many years. In short, one would
seek a careful articulation of the altered performance of industry as well as the degree to which the policy
goals were met.
Effects of the Transition into a Regulated Environment
This research has not addressed the question of how much the industry suffered during the transition, or
what the mandatory changes in mining practice has meant as far as productivity. This would be very
difficult to do within this analysis. Aside from the lack of data prior to 1972, when MSHA began
collecting it, there are compositional hindrances. New mines have come in since 1972. In fact, new
mines account for the vast majority of output.
Some of the best work on the transitional effects appears in a 1981 report by the US General Accounting
Office. The GAO published a report exploring the causes and proposed cures for the prolonged slump in
coal mine productivity. Among the issues studied was the effect of the Coal Act of 1969, cited often by
mine operators as accounting for 22 to 40 percent of the decline' 4 . In the report, GAO concluded of the
effect of the Act:
"While certain practices required by MSHA lowered productivity
substantially, their impact was felt largely during MSHA's implementation
and should not be a continuing source of decline."' 5
'2 § 103(i) of Coal Act
13 § 110(e), allows assessment of fines up to $1000 and a year imprisonment for such acts.
14 US General Accounting Office Low Productivity in American Coal Mining: Causes and Cures. EMD-
81-17, 1981. P.36.
"5 US GAO, op cit. Ref.1, P.36.
Indeed, the report stated that their analysis found that, in 1977, an increase of ten inspection days per year
lowered underground mine productivity by 1.5 percent. The GAO analysis differs from this analysis in
that total number of days of inspection was used to measure enforcement, as opposed to the number of
inspections and resulting citations. Nevertheless, the reports conclusion - that the regulation's main
impact was felt early on - is an important part of the impact picture. Furthermore, the report stated that
"Our statistical analysis indicates that while the act was one cause [of productivity decline], it was
certainly not the only cause, and was not as significant as the coal industry asserts."16
Even the GAO study does not help in deciding whether the coal industry today is better or worse off
because of the regulation - that study was strictly a before and after study. The key to any such analysis is
finding an appropriate comparison, or counterfactual, to what is actually observed. One would need to
predict what the performance of the industry would be today had the regulations not been put in force.
This would require assumptions about how much cheaper new mines would have been, how much
investment would have been generated, and whether alternative reactions to continued working conditions
may not have been worse.
The matter is further complicated upon the realization that some shifts in productivity are mirrored in
other sectors of the economy". Clearly, any predictions of the state of the mining industry in the absence
of regulation is fraught with difficulty and subject to much uncertainty. Furthermore, it is not a terribly
relevant question: Congress intended to improve worker safety with the Act, and fully anticipated it would
come at some cost to industry. Perhaps a more sophisticated question than whether to abolish regulation
is how to ensure or build upon the progress in a manner which minimizes the drag on the regulated
industry.
Worker Safety Under the Coal Act
The safety record for mines after the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act show interesting trends. While
fatal injuries (Figure 5-1) have fallen significantly since passage of the Act, non-fatal injuries do not
appear much affected (Figure 5-2). Furthermore, we are quickly reaching a point where the effects of the
dust-suppression requirements of the Act can be tested against incidence of respiratory disease in miners.
The principal goals of the Act - to protect miners from fatal injuries and reduce the incidence of
respiratory disease - have largely been met. It remains to be seen whether legislation will evolve to
16 US GAO, op cit. Ref. 1, P 35.
17 find them
address non-fatal injuries, which have not improved and were not the main focus of the 1969 and 1977
Acts.
Figure 5-1
Figure 5-2
Conclusions
Industries are continuously evolving. New technologies arise which will improve performance of existing
firms or, if they are unable to employ the new technology, new firms will enter. With each advance in the
state of knowledge, age of capital becomes a bigger hindrance, and a dynamic is observed in which old
producers are steadily forced out of production as newer firms enter. Due to the heterogeneity in the
nature of coal, and the geological determination of these characteristics, changes in the demand for a
grade of coal can cause large regional and methodological shifts in production, as was seen giving rise to
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the Powder River Basin mines. As discussed in Chapter 2, aggregation of production data masks these
very important trends by lumping together non-similar mining regions and methods. It is important to get
to a less aggregated level of information: the coal supply industry is dynamic and evolving, and
technology is the driver.
Were it not for one important input to the production process - labor - that may well be the end of a very
compelling story centered on "creative destruction" spurred by investment and knowledge. Labor,
however, is not an input like capital, materials and energy. In essence, these other inputs are wholly
owned by the producer: a purchased machine is wholly devoted to production. For a miner, his toil and
working conditions have a direct bearing on other facets of life, in particular his safety at work and health
over the rest of his lifetime. To the extent that private market transactions will not fully incorporate these
indirect effects of the nature of the work, a set of limitations and rules are created to reflect society's
standards for just and reasonable working conditions. The reasons for believing that markets are
inadequate arenas to determine an efficient allocation of risk are several and well explained in the
literature. Lack of information; inability to utilize information regarding low-probability, high-
consequence risk; and imperfect competition due to low labor mobility for a typical miner's income and
educational level are the more typical argumentsl". From a social justice perspective, one may object to
the fact that hazardous employment falls disproportionately on the shoulders of low-income persons,
economically efficient as that allocation may be.
The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was aimed at reducing the incidence of and injuries from the most
disastrous mine incidents: collapses and explosions. While it has been successful in that role, no policy
analysis would be complete without examining the costs associated with that success. At a minimum, one
would want to ensure that such safety advances came about in the least expensive manner, even if one did
not want to tackle the thorny issue of whether such protection was worth the price. This analysis
examined the long lasting effects of the Coal Act. These are effects associated with the administrative
burden of operating in a regulated environment, and the impact on productivity associated with non-
compliance. Our evidence supports the notion that, to be a highly productive mine, compliance with the
safety standards is a necessary condition. Furthermore, the purely bureaucratic burden of inspections on
mines was shown to be rather small: for any given number of citations, it made no difference how many
inspections were conducted during the year. What is not yet clear is the mechanism through which non-
compliant mines suffer a loss of productivity: is it through excessive penalties associated with non-
compliance, or are the unsafe practices which define non-compliance inherently inefficient?
"' Ashford, N. A. and C. C. Caldart. Technology, Law, and the Working Environment New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold. 1991. Chapter 5.
Areas for Further Research
Further analysis could help clarify some of these issues. For certain groups of mines, a quarterly time-
series analysis coupled with a more sophisticated specification of explanatory variable would shed light on
the causality issues. Additionally, incorporating mine-level injury data compatible with the current
enforcement and operational data would help answer some of the questions regarding whether citations
truly reflect mine safety conditions.
The research in this thesis focuses principally on federal regulation which concerns itself with
underground mines. As mentioned in Chapter 2, surface mines are specifically addressed in the Surface
Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977. Several factors conspired to frustrate efforts to aptly incorporate
the enforcement of this act into our analysis. First, SMCRA is under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Interior rather than Labor. This means, among other things, that the data gathering practices and
procurement processes are different. Second, the primacy of states under SMCRA has lead to varying
practices across states, as well as decentralized recordkeeping and data gathering. The best data available
in time for this research was from the Office of Surface Mining, which reported federal inspections and
citations, as well as funding levels to states. Neither offers the full detail of mine-level data available
under MSHA's practices. This is not to say that the data is not available, and certainly some good
research could be conducted without requiring data requisition from every state. Data from five large
surface-mining states would provide a good start to examining some of the same issues discussed here.
Surface mines have behaved differently than their underground counterparts in many ways. Some
regions, like the West (excluding Lignite and PRB) have seen their level of productivity stagnate, reaching
1972 levels only in the mid 1980's (see Chapter 2). All surface mines have taken longer to regain their
1972 levels than underground mines, and the cause may be in the different regulatory regime governing
them. If, as was the case in underground mines, the effects of SMCRA were largest during the
transitional period, the relative newness of the surface regulations may explain the lag. If one accepts the
view that new mines designed with knowledge of the regulation suffer less, and therefore the rate of
turnover of productive capacity helps determine how long it takes for the industry to develop least-cost
compliance strategies, then the lower turnover of surface mines, especially in the western regions, may
contribute to the surface-underground lag. The door is wide open for combining such knowledge of the
dynamics of the industry with regulatory enforcement data for surface mines, as this analysis has done for
underground mines.
This thesis has made use, for the first time, of very detailed, mine-level data to study the evolution of mine
labor productivity and the effects of federal regulations. It has identified some critical steps in developing
a solid analysis, such as the drawbacks of excessive aggregation or the choice of explanatory variables.
The results have been illuminating and well-supported. Inspections do not, by themselves, seem to have
much of an impact on productivity. Mine labor productivity is much more seriously impacted by high
levels of citations relating to dangerous conditions. There remain unanswered questions surrounding
causation, and there seems to be a complex feedback of inspections, citations, and safety conditions in a
mine. The impact of MSHA's regulatory efforts is minimal on surface mines, and further study on this
group would be of particular interest given the stark productivity differences among this type of mining
and its large share of national output.
This analysis provides a useful and defensible description of the effects of current regulatory practice. It
also shows the importance of understanding the regional, methodological, and temporal shifts in the
industry which may escape detection by national aggregate measures. The possibilities created by the use
of such a micro-level dataset are vast, and the understanding gained from utilizing such data should
provide motivation for further research.
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Appendix B- STATA Logs
This is a copy of the STATA output for the principal regressions cited in the analysis. Recall that this is
from the dataset which has been purged of mines producing less than 10,000 tons per year, as per EIA
practice. Annotations, for clarity, are in italics.
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> pect cit cit2 citsvr if year>= 1983, noc
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t501 .5762339 .0481921 11.957 0.000
t901 .7082109 .0640071 11.065 0.000
t95 I1 .8323976 .156786 5.309 0.000
t99 I .6076384 .1726304 3.520 0.000
inspect 1 .0016168 .0014964 1.080 0.280
citl I -.0055718 .0020642 -2.699 0.007
cit21 -.0731726 .0569921 '-1.284 0.200
citsvr I -.0322685 .009399 -3.433 0.001
.0362392 .0614913
.0483621 .0764917
.0114936 .0909348
.026453 .1180243
.481602 .6708657
.5825242 .8338976
.5245269 1.140268
.2686548 .9466219
-.0013216 .0045551
-.0096251 -.0015185
-.1850843 .0387391
-.0507248 -.0138122
Western Surface (non Lignite or PRB)
-> regcode= 3 tchcode= 0
Source I SS df MS N
--------- +•-- --------------------- F
Model I 739.333866 12 61.6111555
'umber of obs = 289
( 12, 277) = 268.63
Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual I 63.5316777 277 .229356237 R-squared = 0.9209
-------- +---------------- Adj R-squared = 0.9174
Total I 802.865543 289 2.77808146 Root MSE = .47891
Inprd I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval]
t50yr I .0064525 .0174766 0.369 0.712
t90yr I .0215026 .0367522 0.585 0.559
t95yrl -.0154538 .0528906 -0.292 0.770
t99yr I .0196303 .0405021 0.485 0.628
t50 1 -.3336451 .1266124 -2.635 0.009
t90 1 -.4019172 .2462388 -1.632 0.104
t95 I1 .0228551 .3733118 0.061 0.951
t99 1 1.991454 .2971984 6.701 0.000
inspect I -.0044621 .0269661 -0.165 0.869
citl I -.0271158 .0288098 -0.941 0.347
cit2 I1 .0880903 .103664 0.850 0.396
citsvr I .0473594 .0804795 0.588 0.557
Western Underground
-> regcode= 3 tchcode= I
Source I SS df MS
---------+------------------
Model 525.798151 12 43.8165121
Residual I 115.624214 433 .2670305:
Total I 641.422365 445 1.44139851
Total I 641.422365 445 1.44139857
-.0279513 .0408563
-.0508465 .0938516
-.1195724 .0886648
-.0601007 .0993614
-.5828898 -.0844005
-.8866543 .0828199
-.7120334 .7577437
1.4064 2.576509
-.0575465 .0486224
-.0838299 .0295982
-. 115979 .2921596
-. 1110698 .2057886
Number of obs = 445
F( 12, 433)= 164.09
6 Prob > F = 0.0000
17 R-squared = 0.8197
Adj R-squared = 0.8147
Root MSE = .51675
Inprd I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval]
t5Oyr I .0755972 .0102588
t90yrI .0947433 .0111574
t95yrI .1097563 .0306283
t99yr I .0674747 .0372261
t5O 1 .3856067 .0740216
t90 I1 .8642789 .0862739
t95 I1 1.075977 .2281623
t991 1.360171 .2516537
inspect I .0033881 .0035076
citl I -.0136263 .0042677
cit2 1 .0229395 .0713513
citsvr I -.0218609 .0115495
7.369 0.000
8.492 0.000
3.583 0.000
1.813 0.071
5.209 0.000
10.018 0.000
4.716 0.000
5.405 0.000
0.966 0.335
-3.193 0.002
0.322 0.748
-1.893 0.059
.0554339 .0957605
.0728139 .1166727
.0495576 .169955
-.0056915 .140641
.2401204 .5310931
.6947112 1.033847
.627534 1.524421
.8655559 1.854785
-.003506 .0102821
-.0220143 -.0052384
-.1172984 .1631775
-.044561 .0008392
- --
-- - --
Lignite Surface
-> regcode= 4 tchcode= 0
Source I SS df MS
--4.-------------
Model I 942.56908 12 78.547423
Residual I 62.0788663 224 .2771377
Total I 1004.64795 236 4.2569828
Number of obs = 236
F( 12, 224) = 283.42
3 Prob > F = 0.0000
796 R-squared = 0.9382
Adj R-squared = 0.9349
2 Root MSE = .52644
Inprd I Coef. Std. Err. t P>Iti [95% Conf. Interval]
t50yr I .0948554 .0134368 7.059 0.000
t90yr I .0296364 .0158052 1.875 0.062
t95yrI .0887988 .0512233 1.734 0.084
t99yr .0234999 .2489979 0.094 0.925
t5O I 1.303498 .1186983 10.982 0.000
t90 1 2.230134 .1306226 17.073 0.000
t95 I 1.872373 .3599894 5.201 0.000
t991 1.817747 .7305697 2.488 0.014
inspect -.0165707 .0280905 -0.590 0.556
citl -.0571474 .035195 "-1.624 0.106
cit2 -.0202608 .1330731 -0.152 0.879
citsvr I -.0420637 .0610234 -0.689 0.491
Powder River Basin Surface
-> regcode= 5 tchcode=
Source I SS df MS
Model I 2080.50785 12 173.37565
Residual I 188.596346 251 .7513798
Total -2269.10419 263 8.6277726
Total I 2269.10419 263 8.6277726
.0683766 .1213342
-.0015095 .0607823
-.0121424 .18974
-.4671781 .5141778
1.06959 1.537406
1.972727 2.48754
1.162974 2.581772
.3780785 3.257416
-.0719261 .0387848
-.126503 .0122082
-.2824961 .2419746
-.1623171 .0781897
Number of obs = 263
F( 12, 251)= 230.74
.4 Prob > F = 0.0000
66 R-squared = 0.9169
Adj R-squared = 0.9129
Root MSE = .86682
Inprd I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ld [95% Conf. Interval]
I
t50yr .009793 .0261111
t90yr .0646721 .0230691
t95yr -.0170591 .0462897
t99yr I .0720404 .0423932
t50 .9185917 .2096574
t901 1.101874 .1799525
t95 .9283736 .3443883
t99 .9406568 .3257438
inspect I .1745497 .0847053
citl I .1337555 .0854381
cit2 .2116184 .2796498
citsvr I .1218458 .2386405
0.375 0.708
2.803 0.005
-0.369 0.713
1.699 0.090
4.381 0.000
6.123 0.000
2.696 0.007
2.888 0.004
2.061 0.040
1.566 0.119
0.757 0.450
0.511 0.610
-.0416318 .0612177
.0192386 .1101057
-.1082249 .0741067
-.0114513 .155532
.5056798 1.331504
.7474651 1.456284
.2501146 1.606633
.2991174 1.582196
.007726 .3413735
-.0345115 .3020225
-.3391407 .7623775
-.3481471 .5918386
. log close
4)
(1.-
--
